Economic and Financial Review
Volume 32

Number 3

Article 2

9-1-1994

Supervision of banking industry in Nigeria: an operator's viewpoint
J. O. Sanusi

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.cbn.gov.ng/efr

Recommended Citation
Sanusi, J. O. (1994). Supervision of banking industry in Nigeria: an operator's viewpoint, CBN Economic
and Financial Review, (EFR), 32(3), 337-343.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CBN Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Economic and Financial Review by an authorized editor of CBN Institutional Repository. For more
information, please contact dc@cbn.gov.ng.

CBN ECoNOMIC & FINANCIAL REVIEW' VOL. 32, No. 3:
Supervision of Banking IndustrT in Nigeria

337-343

- An Operator's Viewpoint

by

J. O. Sanusi*

1.

Intrcduction

First of all, I feel most delighted to be part of this seminar which, judging ftom the
objectives, the topical nature ofthe issues to be covered and the calibre ofthe speakers, is going
to be a major learning process for the participants. It is also coming at a most auspicious time.
The Nigerian banking industry has witnessed tremendous 6hanges in the last few years and the
momentum has not abated in terms of growth and diversity in spite of the blockage placed on
entry. It is therefore most logical that as the regulator and the supervisory body of the industry
the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) should continuously update itself of the dwelopments in
the industry and in fact keep ahead of developments. I therefore identiS with the effort of the
Research Department and the Training Centre of the CBN in organising this seminar.
Secondly, my presence here today is like a sort of home-coming. A few years ago, I was
a part of this gfeat team and I still cherish very much, my years of association with the CBN.
Of course, this places me in a unique position of having been on both sides of the divide and
therefore places an extra burden on me in preparing my paper. In a way, having once been part
of the regulatory system, it is like being asked to assess the efFrcacy of one's own
medication. There is no doubt however that this kind of cross+xchange of ideas is healthy for
the system.

2.

The Regulatory Envircnment

As the title of my topic goes, I am to present from the practical point of view, the operator's
assessment of the supervisory role of the Central Bank of Nigeria on banks in particular and
the financial industry in general.

The starting point for supervision is obviously the existence ofa set ofrules or defined
parameters within which financial institutions are supposed to operate. The supervisory role
therefore, is to ensure that the institutions concerned operate within those rules through a
system of regular monitoring. Dwiations ftom the set nrles and standards must of course, lead
to sanctions.
I will not bore you or attempt to "export coal to Newcastle" by going through the details
of the regulatory framework in Nigeria, its evolution and development nor try to itemise the
existing and specific regulations. I expect every body in this hall to be sufficiently conversant
with this and it will therefore suffice to say that the laws that regulate the operations of banking
and financial institutions in the country are the Central Bank of Nigeria Decree No. 24 and the
Baoks and Other Financial Institutions Decree No. 25 both promulgated in 1991. The CBN
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derives its power to regulate, monitor and supervise the industry from these two decrees and
the extent of its powers is total and virtually monopolistic.

3.

Objectives of Banking Superuision
The objectives ofbanking supervision should derive from the regulatory objective ofthe

Central Bank which'is "to promote monetary stability and a sound financial system in
Nigeria".
Thus, banking supervision must seek to ensure that the monetary and payment system

of

the country is not impaireq promote the monetisation of the economy, protect customers'
interests and deposits and ensure that the confidence reposed in the monetary system which is
basic to the stability of the economy as a whole is not destroyed. And how does banking
supervision ensure that these objectives are realised? Simply pug by avoiding and eliminating
bank failures. In whatever ways we define the roles and objectives of banking zupervision, the
end-point is the prwention of bank failures for as we shall s6s, the yhole system of banking
supervision and examination is to identi$ those things that can lead to the failure of a bank
and nip them in the bud. Conversely, it is the tendency of banks to operate outside the ambit
delined by banking regulation and supervision that leads to failures.

4.

Importance of Banking Supervision

Stability in the banking system of a country is a sine qua non to the stability of the
overall economy. As a reflection of this, failure of an institution in another industry, painftl as
it might be, does not portend as much oonsequences to other sectors ofthe economy as a bank
failure. When a $ank fails, its depositors are put in jeopardy, other banks become threatened
and the integrity of the payment mechanism for the entire economy is compromised. Thus
banking supervision whose primary objective is to forestall and prwentbank failures is crucial
to the survival of the financial ar\d economic systems.

5.

Apprcach to Banking Supervision

Banking supervision is done in three broad ways. First, banks are supervised through
returns zubmitted regularly to the Central Bank and in this respect the two Departments involved are Banking Supervision and Bank Examination. The monthly and quarterly returns
sent to these two Departments of Central Bank constitute a veritable source of information and
data base to monitor the activities of banks. [f these are carefully and efrectively analysed
regularly, they should be able to trigger offearly enough, those banks on the road to distress.
Supported by the other means of monitoring to be mentioned below, the potency of these
returns in enabling the CBN to ensure sanity in the banking system cannot be under+.stimated.
Secondly, banls are supervised through bank examination or inspection performed
on-site. These audits, carried out by the Bank Examination Department of the CBN enable the
CBN to examine the boo}s of a bank in greater details and perform more deailed investigations in areas of suspicion. In performing this role, CBN Benk Examiners have *ide porvers to
request for whatever information are deemed necessary to the investigation. The on-site bank
examinations also enable the CBN to assess the veracity of the returns that arc submitted by
that bank.
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There is a key and crucial spill-over effect from this and that is, the knowledge that CBN
examiners can swoop in at any time is enough deterrent to malpractices and this deterrent
should not be under-estimated. Ilaving been on both sides of the hill, I know what I am trlking
about.

Finally, effective supervision is carried out by the requirernent that banks must seek the
approval and permission of the CBN to do certain things. Thesg controls exercised tlrough the
Benking Supervision Department is another effective meatrs of supervision, as the CBN, with
previous data bank, is able to compare the facts used in supporting a rq1uest to prwiously
supplied data.
Taking altogether, the three systen$ ofbanking supervision can lead to effective control
if adequately well-manags6 and coordinated.

6.

Identity of Intercst of,Supervisors and Operators

Banks have their own internal system ofsupervision - i.e. their respective Inspection
Division. Generally, the inspectors are dreaded and feared and are often regarded as criminal

investigators. By and large, banks are trying to correct this negative image of inspectors. But
it should not come as a surprise to you that CBN's Bank Examiners are sometimes regarded in
similar light. Being Examiners, the result must either be pass or fail and banks sometimes find
this situation uneasy. I will like to tell the story I once heard on CBN's Examiners. One of
them after all the observations and allegations in his report have been debunked, erplained
that although he observed that the Bank had a fault-proof system, he still had to report some
inadequacies otherwise his bosses will think he had not done a thorough job.
This may sound like a fiction but it indicates the way some people sometimes view CBN
Bank Examiners.
I must state that sincc the cardinal objective ofbanking supervision is to ensure a healthy
banking system and prevent banlc failure, then both the supervisors and operators must have an
identity of interest in the way they see banking examination and supervision. Any operator

who thErefore sees something wrong in banking examination must be suspect. In my
experience both as a regulator and supervisor and also as an operator, I have nwer eome across
the report of a CBN Bank Examination which has not been beneficial to the bank examined
at least to the owners, depositors and the public at large if even the management is dishonest

-

and fraudulenL Now, let us examine the potential benefits of banking examination to
op€rators.

7.

Benefits of Banking Supervision/Dxamination to Operators

A cursory look at the checklist or information requirement of CBN from a Bank it wants
to examine gives an indication of the thoroughness of these examinations. The list covers all
the areas of a bank's operations - lending and other risk assets, foreigrr operations, branch
operations and the critica! aspects of a bank's Balance Sheet including liquidity, capital
adequacy and prudential ratios. fircy also look extensively into the adequacy or otherwise of
the organisational resouccs nesded to support the bank's operations. Finally, separate examinations are caried on the oomputer or information systems of the Bank. The report is usually
copious of recommendations on the key parameters and issues. To the honest bank which seeks
ways of improving on its operations, enhancing controls and protecting its assets, the CBN
examination reports are regarded as most valuable documents. I have no doubt in my mind
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t]lat most banks cherish these reports which they would have had to pay heavily for if they were
to invite consultants to perform such studies. You will recollect that I always refer to these
reports as free consultancy and I can now more than ever testiry to that fact.
The requirement - which we initiated - that these reports be presented to the full Board
of the banh by CBN's examiners put teeth into them as the findings can no longer be sup
pressed from the directors. ?he obligation that penalties imposed on banks for breaches of
CBN's regulations and guidelines be reflected in the annual reports also serve as similar
deterrent.

t.

The Challenges of Banking Supervision

As earlier mentioned, the indusry has grown tremendously in the last ftw years leading
to an increase in the volume and complexity of banking supervision in Nigeria.
From a total of 2E in 1980, the number of commercial and merchant banks in the
countrygrewsteadilyto40in iggObeforestabilisingat4gin 1987. Beginningfrom 1988,the
growth rate in the number ofbanks has been phenomenal such that by 1990, the number has
risen to over 100. As at today not less than 120 banks (commercial and merchant ba*s)
operate in the country. If we add the numerous financial houses and community banks that
have emerged since ttren, then the challenges facing the Central Bank to ensure that these
institutions are adequately monitored to ensure that they operate within the confines of the law
become almost mind-boggling.
Is the CBN positioned to meet this increasing challenge of banking zupervision? Is it
endowed with the necessary resources, in quality and quantity; materials, technical and
personnel to cope with these challenges?
We are no doubt in a period of fluidity and uncertainty where nothing is constant for any
length of time. Since the last wave of banking failures in the 1950s with the last recorded
failure of Central Bank of Nigeria (which we need to emphasise, bears no relationship with our
present day apex institution) in 1960, the industry has remained free from major distress in the
banking system until the early 1990s. There is adequate evidenee to show that the perceived
stability in the industry has been the result of protection. In wery instance that the protective
system has been relaxed, there has been crisis in the system. The experience of the removal of
Government funds from the banking system in 1989, the withdrawal of foreign guamnteed
lending in I 989 and the effect of the introduction of the Prudential Guidelines in 1990 all come
to mind. Many observers believe that where the industry is adequately deregulated and the
forex business becomes less monopolistic, many banks in the system will not be able to
withstand the resulting competition.
Also in 1992, the fact of distressed banks became a major issue in the industry, and this
phenomenon was not peculiar to State-owned banks but to a number of the newer generation
and some older generation banks. Thus, after thirty-four years of the last recorded bank failure
in Nigeri4 the Central Bank had to wield the big axe by closing two banks in the country in
January 1994. Last week, it had to close down two other banks.
Ladies and GentlemerL you will recollect that as the growth in number of banks gathered momentum beginning in 198E, no one in his wildest imagination even within the CBN,
assumed that all banks being licenced would operate efficiently, succes$rlly and survive. Such
a utopia was never anticipated and would not reflect the realities of a competitive environrnent.
What I am saying here is that a situation where some banks wouldfail was anticipated and that
informed the establishrnent of NDIC to take care of such wentualrty.
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The current sihration has fusqrsysl been worse than expected because of faetors both
extenul (not controllable) and internal to the distressedbanks. The external factors are macroeconomic instability fuelled by fiscal indiscipline, misapplication of some monetary tools
especially stabilisation securitie,s. The internal fuctors which are of course more important are
the incompetence, mis-management an malpractices by the Board and Management of the
affected banks. Bnnking zupervision/examination often give an early indication of these
internd critical problems.
Thus, this recent phenomenon of instability in the banking system is not due to absence
of adequate regulatory framework as was in the case in the 1930s and 1950s but more to a
structural and environmental phenomenon on the one hand and glaring lack of prudency on
the part of some of the banks on the other hand.
If therefore, the regulatoryframework is reasonably adequate, then what is the cause of
the present instability in the industry? The obvious :uswer is that the supervisory framework
needs fiuther strengthening to cope with the rising challenges. I am in no way implying that
the sryervisory firnctions arc not being well done for I know the commitment and sacrifices
being made by the personnel in those functional areas. But the magnitude of growth in the
financp sector will naturally lead to a time lag before resources reach commensumte level for
the suprwisory flrnctions. Of course, when one adds the propensity to beat regulations and
cheat Erirhin the system, then one knows that the challenges facing banking supervision in
Nigeria is a daunting one.
Problems have apparently been allowed to accumulate. To be effective, examination
re,ports must be followed up with appropriate and timely action especially where major decisions like financial input, restructing or even liquidation are to be implemented. Too many
rotten apples have been allowed to remain in the basket for too long.
On a personal note and assessment, apart from personal involvement at a stage, I have
been an avid observer of the efforts qf Senking supervision in Nigeria both as a regulator and as
an operator and I can say with a high degree ofconfidence that the standard ofpractice is quite
high. As a regulator, I felt pleased with the kind of reports and response that come out of the
system. As an operator, I have taken as a challenge to live within the rules and regulations of
the apex bank and I have at all times found the reports of the banking examinations most us€firl
and helpful. If the recommendations I make below are adopted and implemente4 I have no
doubt thal the efficiency of the supervision fimction will even be better improVed.

9.

Recommendations

(a)

Prcvision of Adequate Resources
To cope with the increasing complexity of banking supervision in a fast glowing
sector of the economy, the zupervisory functions need to be adequately endowed
in resources. These include spaoe, equipment and modern technologl, materids
and most importanfly adequate and well-trained resources. The system has itself
to blame if the supervisory units arc not adoquately endorved in the face of the
rapid growth in the sector they are 3o srpervise.
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Ttaining
Tb update their knowledge, expertise and techniques, there is a need for consant
62ining of the personnel responsible for banking zupervision.

(c)

Probi$r tr'airness and Fimness

In

it is believed that everybody can be bought at a price, it
personnel
of banking zupervision to s'tand above these insinuations
behoves the
for it is then and only then that it can bring the full force of the law and
regulations to those whose stock in trade is to violate them. One hears the rumours
of people buying CBN officials. I have no doubt that Oese are mainly nunouns
and it is the responsibility of those ofyou gathered here today to keep them rumours.

(d)

a society where

Prcsentation of Exrmination Reports
Once the draft reports of your examinations are ready, this shouldbe discussed at
length with some key officials of the institution. I have seen instances where
erroneous comments are incorporated in these reports. If the drafts are discussed,
it will ofrer the opportunity of correcting those errors e.g. names of direclors,
number of branches, details of certain accounts. These unnecessary mistakes
sometimes distract from the import of these reports. But banking examiners should
and must never compromise on facts and evidence as they found them.

(e)

Submission of Examination Reports
The practice ofensuringlhat these reports are presented to the Board ofDirectors
of the banks should be maintained and emphasised. In particuiu; the reports
must be presented within agreed time frame.

(f)

tr'ollow-up and Monitoring

I have observed that perhaps as a result of the enormity of the job, it has become
difficult to follow-up on bank examination reports. The timeJag between routine
bank examinations may be too long for adequate follow-up. I recommend that a
diary system to monitor implementation of recommendations during bank
examinations should be instituted. This will go a long way in ensuring that bank
examiners meet improved position when they visit next.

(g)

Imposition of Sanctions
Where enforcement of sanctions is lax, there is usually, little adherencp to rules.
Also, the easiest way to ensure that the generality of people and institutions obey
laiddown regulations is to demonstrate that the conse4uences of violation is high
and this is done most effectively by imposing and enforcing sanctions whenever
the need arises.
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(h)

Sourcing Personnel from the Operators

It is said that the easiest way to break up a gang is to infiltrate

it.

So far,
personnel have moved from the regulatory institutions to the operators in the
rnain. The time has come to at least try to reverse this trend. I have no doubt in
my mind that so much benefits would be derived if the CBN can recruit from the
banking system into the supervisory functions.

(i)

Extension of Supervision to Related Companies

It

seems that, banking supervision presently concentrates only on the main
institutions while there affrliates and associated companies operate mainly
outside the ambit of the CBN. This situation needs to be urgently redressed. in
line with the Basle Convention. Banks and other financial institutions should
report details of associated companies in which they have sigfficant interest.

Bank examinations should be made to cover these associates if found necessary.
Thus, we have the ironic situation whereby banks are prevented from doing cer
tain things but get away with it when they use afrliated companies. By and large,
the distressed situation in some of the banks can be attributed to these. I suggest
that the CBN should move early and strongly to cover this loophole. In the U.K.
for instarrce, all financial institutions must provide dgtailed report on all such
affrliates and not only that, the institution is exp*ted to assume responsibilities
for their sustenan@ provided they maintain a certain level of equity or constitute
the single largest shareholder. That explains, why our foreign affliate for 100
years, the Standard Chartered Bank had to reduce its shareholding in First Bank.
The reason is purely due to the regulatory requirement in the U.K. where
Standard Chartered is deemed to be responsible for First Bank when in actual
fact, because of the local operating environment, it has virually no control on the
management of First Bank. I think we can learn a lot from this.

0)

Finally, as much as possible, CBN should in public statements avoid generalisation
that tend to condemn the whole of the banking system. This dents confidence in
the financial system and the first victims are the weaker ones and the immediate
result is systemic, and consequent aggravation of distress and problems for CBN
and NDIC. Regulatory authorities statements must always be designed to
enhance confidence in the system. Where a rotten apple is discovered let it be
prompfly identified to the public and removed from the basket.

I thank you for listening.

J. O. SANUSI
Managing Dircctor & Chief Executive,
First Bank of Nigeria PLC,
Lagos..

